Every AI agent is an insider threat sits next to the advice to scale agents for detection and response, and those are not the same boundary. A sandbox that keeps the patch agent off the production network is isolation. It does not decide whether that agent may open a change against the service it just scanned. I would bind the write to the vulnerability id and the file the scanner named, and refuse a diff that touches anything else, even when the process never left its box.
There’s something wonderfully circular about responding to "every AI agent is an insider threat" by scaling up more agents. The real security boundary may stop being human vs machine and become authority: who or what gets to act without asking.
Old agent credentials belong on the zombie list too. Pilot keys and service accounts handed to agents often outlive the pilot, and an environment inventory misses them because nothing visibly runs there anymore.
Calling every AI agent an insider threat may be the line security teams end up quoting for a while. Most corporate defenses still assume the dangerous actor sits outside the firewall, and an agent holding broad credentials quietly flips that assumption. Shutting down zombie test environments and old CI/CD projects sounds unglamorous, yet forgotten systems like those have been where state-linked groups from China and Russia found footholds in past breaches. The tension with product teams will be interesting to watch. A freeze on new features until everything is patched is a big ask for startups living on release cycles, and the companies that actually follow through could end up with a real edge when the next wave of agent-driven exploits hits. Worth seeing whether larger enterprises adopt the same posture or wait for a headline incident first.
Every AI agent is an insider threat sits next to the advice to scale agents for detection and response, and those are not the same boundary. A sandbox that keeps the patch agent off the production network is isolation. It does not decide whether that agent may open a change against the service it just scanned. I would bind the write to the vulnerability id and the file the scanner named, and refuse a diff that touches anything else, even when the process never left its box.
There’s something wonderfully circular about responding to "every AI agent is an insider threat" by scaling up more agents. The real security boundary may stop being human vs machine and become authority: who or what gets to act without asking.
Old agent credentials belong on the zombie list too. Pilot keys and service accounts handed to agents often outlive the pilot, and an environment inventory misses them because nothing visibly runs there anymore.
Calling every AI agent an insider threat may be the line security teams end up quoting for a while. Most corporate defenses still assume the dangerous actor sits outside the firewall, and an agent holding broad credentials quietly flips that assumption. Shutting down zombie test environments and old CI/CD projects sounds unglamorous, yet forgotten systems like those have been where state-linked groups from China and Russia found footholds in past breaches. The tension with product teams will be interesting to watch. A freeze on new features until everything is patched is a big ask for startups living on release cycles, and the companies that actually follow through could end up with a real edge when the next wave of agent-driven exploits hits. Worth seeing whether larger enterprises adopt the same posture or wait for a headline incident first.