Venture marked up 16% and buyout marked down 4%, and the people grading both are the funds themselves. Cute scoreboard. A mark isn't a sale, so I'd wait for actual exits before declaring a winner. Both sides are just telling LPs a story they're paid to tell.
"Top quartile venture beat top quartile buyout" So the best of a risky asset, beat the best of a less risky asset. That's like saying you should invest in biotech because the best in biotech beats Berkshire
Useful data, with one caution on the comparison. Venture marks up 16 percent against buyout down 4 percent in H1 use different valuation methods, as the piece itself footnotes, so they are not like for like. And 5.3x DPI for the top 5 percent of venture funds is not what the median LP receives. What does median DPI look like on each side?
From the credit side, PE isn't cooked, but the 2019–2021 leverage math is. When the cost of debt runs above the asset's yield, returns have to come from operations, not the capital structure. That's a different skill set than a lot of funds were built for.
The ideal street analogy carries all the way through to the rezoning part. The detail I keep coming back to is the seven year average exit. Over a hold that long, multiple expansion can't be counted on, so whatever the company actually got better at has to carry more of the return. I'd like to hear whether that pushes buyout firms toward bigger operating teams or toward smaller deals.
The line about deals now needing 10 to 12% EBITDA growth instead of 5% is the one that stuck with me, and it's partly why I think permanent capital is having a moment, I covered Onodrim on Monday which raised a $300m Series A at a $1.3b valuation to take controlling stakes in European defence suppliers and the whole pitch is that they never have to sell in seven years. Feels like that only works if the tech side actually speeds those businesses up though, otherwise it's just a slower buyout with a nicer story.
The “12 is the new 5” math stuck with me. Your Golub point adds to it: revenue growth fell from 9% to under 3% while EBITDA kept rising, so margin is carrying the story. Turning that margin work back into growth is the harder job, and it’s where AI in operations really gets tested.
There's something almost touching about an industry where you can own the asset, decide what it's worth, and remain genuinely surprised when the buyer disagrees.
Great analysis on why venture and buyout investing require fundamentally different diligence and can play very different roles in a portfolio.
One of the biggest mistakes is exactly what you pointed out “The pattern you see is also why the most fatal error in venture is trying to time innovation.”
It’s striking how many sophisticated and savvy investment committees still believe they can “time” private market investing (despite having long-term investment objectives)!
The mortgage outgrowing the house line stuck with me. If the owners are doing the appraising, how would any of us spot the problem before the lender takes the keys?
with the future outlook remaining hawkish under the Warsh regime, rate cuts remain a low probability. This might really prove detrimental for PEs especially in the US.
The PIK line is the one any lender reads first. When the interest gets added to the loan instead of paid, the business has already given you the answer. Same rule at small business level: if it can't pay from its own cash, the debt is just buying time.
Venture marked up 16% and buyout marked down 4%, and the people grading both are the funds themselves. Cute scoreboard. A mark isn't a sale, so I'd wait for actual exits before declaring a winner. Both sides are just telling LPs a story they're paid to tell.
Masterclass in talking your own book
"Top quartile venture beat top quartile buyout" So the best of a risky asset, beat the best of a less risky asset. That's like saying you should invest in biotech because the best in biotech beats Berkshire
Useful data, with one caution on the comparison. Venture marks up 16 percent against buyout down 4 percent in H1 use different valuation methods, as the piece itself footnotes, so they are not like for like. And 5.3x DPI for the top 5 percent of venture funds is not what the median LP receives. What does median DPI look like on each side?
Good read.
From the credit side, PE isn't cooked, but the 2019–2021 leverage math is. When the cost of debt runs above the asset's yield, returns have to come from operations, not the capital structure. That's a different skill set than a lot of funds were built for.
The ideal street analogy carries all the way through to the rezoning part. The detail I keep coming back to is the seven year average exit. Over a hold that long, multiple expansion can't be counted on, so whatever the company actually got better at has to carry more of the return. I'd like to hear whether that pushes buyout firms toward bigger operating teams or toward smaller deals.
The line about deals now needing 10 to 12% EBITDA growth instead of 5% is the one that stuck with me, and it's partly why I think permanent capital is having a moment, I covered Onodrim on Monday which raised a $300m Series A at a $1.3b valuation to take controlling stakes in European defence suppliers and the whole pitch is that they never have to sell in seven years. Feels like that only works if the tech side actually speeds those businesses up though, otherwise it's just a slower buyout with a nicer story.
The “12 is the new 5” math stuck with me. Your Golub point adds to it: revenue growth fell from 9% to under 3% while EBITDA kept rising, so margin is carrying the story. Turning that margin work back into growth is the harder job, and it’s where AI in operations really gets tested.
The 'this is fine' dog with a $140B maturity wall in 2028 is doing a lot of work in this piece. LPs re-upping anyway is the part I can't get past.
There's something almost touching about an industry where you can own the asset, decide what it's worth, and remain genuinely surprised when the buyer disagrees.
And they say no one rings a bell to signify the top of the market…
Great analysis on why venture and buyout investing require fundamentally different diligence and can play very different roles in a portfolio.
One of the biggest mistakes is exactly what you pointed out “The pattern you see is also why the most fatal error in venture is trying to time innovation.”
It’s striking how many sophisticated and savvy investment committees still believe they can “time” private market investing (despite having long-term investment objectives)!
At what point do Venture capitalists become the targets of democratic investigations though? There's obviously been a lot of corruption.
The mortgage outgrowing the house line stuck with me. If the owners are doing the appraising, how would any of us spot the problem before the lender takes the keys?
with the future outlook remaining hawkish under the Warsh regime, rate cuts remain a low probability. This might really prove detrimental for PEs especially in the US.
The PIK line is the one any lender reads first. When the interest gets added to the loan instead of paid, the business has already given you the answer. Same rule at small business level: if it can't pay from its own cash, the debt is just buying time.