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James Andrews's avatar

Dr. Li - thank you for this beautiful essay. Your examples resonated deeply, especially Watson & Crick's physical model-building. There's something profound about how they worked: not just imagining plausible structures, but systematically testing each configuration against Rosalind Franklin's X-ray data, Chargaff's ratios, and chemical bonding constraints until they found the ONE structure that satisfied everything simultaneously.

It made me think about Kuhn's observation that scientific paradigms encode centuries of collective wisdom - not just about spatial relationships, but about what counts as authoritative evidence and valid reasoning. Our institutions, for all their imperfections, represent tens of thousands of years of accumulated human knowledge about verification, authority, and truth.

Your world models open extraordinary creative possibilities. And perhaps there's room for both kinds of intelligence: generative systems that imagine plausible worlds, and governance architectures that preserve institutional constraints. Watson & Crick needed both imagination AND authoritative grounding.

The question isn't whether machines should think spatially - clearly they must. But as we build these systems, how do we ensure they honor the difference between what's plausible and what's provably correct when human welfare depends on that distinction?

Thank you for advancing this vital frontier.

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Patrick Stuart-Constant's avatar

Fascinating essay. You finished convincing me that world models are a next step towards creating thinking machines (as opposed to reasoning machines).

Concerning the three capabilities of world models. I’m wondering whether the first capability (physical consistency) doesn’t limit the second (generating according to input/prompt) — especially when accounting for the third (consistency between past and present states)?

Say I want to operate within a world model that replicates Earth today. It would be possible to prompt to move an object from point A to point B while maintaining physical and temporal consistency. However, how could I prompt the addition of a new object to the world model whilst respecting either physical or temporal consistency?

The statement: “the world model should produce an output consistent with the world’s previous state” implies, in a causal world, that any input cannot be added midway through the chain of events but must be added at its inception. It would be impossible to add an ex nihilo cause to a world already in a specific state. That cause should already be in the model since the start, at least as a probable forecasted state? But if it’s already included in the model in that state, you are not adding to that state.

You therefore have thus paradoxical situation where you want to add a cause to a world in a specific state but to add that cause you either need to disregard laws of physics and/or of temporality/causality; or that cause needs to have been included in a forecast of the chain of the events since the inception of that world, in which case you are not adding it.

Or when adding an input to a world model in a specific state, do you resimulate the past states that would have led to that world model in that state with the new input? So the new state isn’t really consistent with the initial past state, but with a new past state?

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